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Introduction  
Since the publication of Hegemony and Social Strategy in 1985, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe 
are widely acknowledged as leading representatives of post-Marxism and ‘radical democratic’ theory. They 
have sought to transform the left political imaginary beyond the impasses characteristic of traditional 
Marxist categories (Sim, 2000: Wenman, 2003). Both Laclau and Mouffe in their single authored works 
have developed distinct and original contributions to political theory. Mouffe, has engaged with 
mainstream political theory and developed her own agonistic approach (Mouffe, 1993, 2000, 2005; 
Wenman, 2003). Laclau has reworked of a range of concepts drawn not only from Marxism, but also in part 
from other traditions across political theory and political science. This is evident not just in Hegemony and 
Social Strategy, but also in his subsequent publications: New Reflection on the Revolutions of Our Times 
(1990), Emancipation(s) (1996), and On Populist Reason (2005). In these texts, Laclau creatively rereads key 
concepts – such as hegemony, populism, emancipation, and representation - through the lenses of 
poststructuralism, and to further develop and re-signify these ideas in innovative directions. He sought 
specially to augment the legacy of the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci, and to further develop the 
Gramscian emphasis on politics, or the realm of the ‘superstructures’, i.e. against reductionist or 
‘economistic’ readings of Marxism. For Laclau, this was an effort to explain the growing diversity of 
struggles – not only socialist struggles, but also feminism, environmentalism, etc. - from the late 1960s 
onwards. In so doing, he fashioned a range of innovate concepts – for example the idea of a struggle over 
‘empty signifiers’ and the need for a ‘chain of equivalence’ between alternate demands – each designed to 
explain the dynamics at play in the struggle for emancipation and freedom. Of course, these 
accomplishments have not been without controversy. They have, for example, provoked a hostile reaction 
from those committed to traditional Marxist forms of analysis (See Geras, 1988; Terry Eagleton: 1991). 
Despite these responses however, Laclau is arguably the foremost post-Marxist of the late twentieth 
century and the influence and impact of his work is gradually growing. Four years after his untimely death, 
Laclau’s legacy is flourishing. This is evident, in the growing influence of the Essex School of discourse 
analysis which was founded by Laclau and where his ideas have been further developed by subsequent 
generations of thinkers; most notably by David Howarth and Jason Glynos who have developed the 
methodological approach of ‘social logics’ of critical explanation (social, political and fantasmatic), which 
explicitly reworks Laclau’s and Mouffe’s post-Marxism (Howarth, 2000, 2010; Glynos and Howarth, 2007). 
More generally, Laclau’s categories continue to influence new generations of radical left thinkers; from key 
political figures in Latin America to those associated with Syrizia in Greece and PODEMOS in Spain. 
Moreover, his ideas are gradually gaining more traction within mainstream political science, which remains 
the most sophisticated account of this pressing contemporary phenomena. 
In the secondary literature, Laclau’s work has most often been contrasted with other continental 
thinkers, for example with the contributions of Gilles Deleuze, Antoni Negri, William Connolly, Slavoj Žižek, 
Jacques Rancière and Alain Badiou. These are valuable and interesting contributions, which have, for the 
most part, focused on the ontological differences between these various thinkers, seen for example 
variously as theorists of ‘abundance’ and ‘lack’. Here, I take a new and different approach, one that 
amalgamates the respective strengths of continental and analytical theory to provide a multi-layered 
analysis of contemporary forms of domination and to better aid our understanding about the kinds of 
struggle needed to address them. My objective is to keep the focus on Laclau’s contribution to political 
theory, and to evaluate the political implications of Laclau’s post-Marxist understanding of the concepts of 
domination and conversely of emancipation and freedom. To scrutinise these ideas, I bring Laclau’s 
approach into conversation with another important contemporary political theorist with whom Laclau 
would not normally be associated. This is Philip Pettit, who works broadly within the analytical tradition of 
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contemporary political theory, and who in several important works – and most notably Republicanism: a 
theory of freedom and government in 1999 - has developed an influential neo-republican conception of 
liberty as ‘non-domination’. Pettit’s impact on Anglo-American theory is significant to the point that neo-
republicanism is the ‘major alternative to liberal political theory’ (Besson and Marti, 2009: 3). The 
paper weaves back and forth exploring points of similarity and difference between Laclau and Pettit, and 
this juxtaposition brings out aspects of Laclau’s theory that are perhaps otherwise overlooked. My 
objective is not simply to dismiss Pettit’s approach, and in fact we see that there is much to be admired in 
the neo-republican conception of non-domination, but an examination of the limits of Pettit’s perspective 
also helps to foreground the strengths of Laclau’s theory and vice versa. This reading discloses the 
important elements that are carried over from the classical Marxist categories, and creatively readapted in 
Laclau’s post-Marxism. This comparison takes us beyond an interpretative exercise to better address 
complex forms of power and domination in late modern society. 
On one level, we see that Pettit and Laclau share much in common. Like Laclau, Pettit’s approach 
focuses on prospects for changing existing institutions so they better serve the freedom of citizens. Pettit 
avoids the worst excesses of the tendency towards abstraction which often defines analytical, or ‘ideal 
theory’. At the core of Pettit’s theory is his notion of liberty as non-domination, which he draws from the 
republican tradition, but of course this language of domination/non-domination is also associated with 
Marxism, as well as other critical approaches such as feminism. Indeed, as we will see: the concepts of 
domination, emancipation and freedom each have shared roots in both the republican and Marxist 
traditions, and part of my objective here is to compare their respective reworkings of this common 
heritage.1 Indeed, both Laclau and Pettit aim to reconfigure power and domination towards more 
democratic and egalitarian relations. In Laclau’s terminology we could say that - in different ways - they 
each seek to expand the logic of equality within the public realm. Furthermore, because of these broad 
shared objectives, Laclau and Pettit also share a common aversion towards liberal conceptions of freedom 
in terms of non-interference or ‘negative liberty’. From each of their respective viewpoints, liberal 
conceptions of freedom are inadequate because they do not take account of what Pettit, following in the 
republican tradition, calls ‘arbitrary power’, which can still operate in society even when there may be no 
explicit interference in the ‘free’ choices of individuals. 
Despite these common points of reference, we see also that the two authors exhibit considerable 
differences, and that these variations have significant consequences for their respective conceptions of 
politics. These dissimilarities manifest across two key and interrelated fault lines. The first is in their 
respective conceptions of agency. Here, we see that Pettit, like many in the analytical tradition, works with 
methodological individualism, whereas Laclau develops a complex account of structure and agency, that is, 
in his account of what he calls structural ‘dislocation’. Indeed, for Pettit, individuals are the always the 
potential bearers of either arbitrary power or freedom and when he attempts to explain more structural 
manifestations of power,2 he effectively models collective or group agency on methodological 
individualism. By way of contrast, Laclau starts from the (Althusserian) premise that the dominant 
structures ‘interpellate’ individuals as subjects, but, on Laclau’s account, they fail repeatedly to achieve this 
aim, that is with any completion or ‘totality’. Moreover, it is in this constitutive failure of social structures 
to ever fully determine an objective order, that we find the potential emergence of a subject of freedom 
and emancipation, i.e. in a moment of structural ‘dislocation’ (Laclau, 1996: 101; 1996b: 54).3 These are 
crucial differences, and they lead, in turn, to another key distinction between the two authors, which is 
that for Pettit political freedom is a mode of contestability within the established institutions, whilst 
Laclau’s notions of emancipation and freedom functions at the level of competing hegemonic projects, and 
this facilitates a form of political struggle that might transcend the existing regime to instantiate a new 
institutional order. 
                                                      
1 It is important to note that there is an alternative mode of the neo-republican revival within contemporary continental theory. 
See: Hardt and Negri, 2009.  
2 See for example, McCormick, 2003; Markell, 2008; Hirschmann, 2009; Thompson, 2013.  
3 For Laclau, dislocation is inscribed into the logic of any structure and it is the trace of contingency within the structure. 
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The paper is divided into three sections. In the opening section, I compare Laclau’s and Pettit’s 
respective conceptions of ‘domination’. We see that Pettit’s neo-republican theory provides valuable 
resources for understanding the exercise of arbitrary power by an individual, which he models on the 
relationship between master and slave. However, despite his acknowledgment that the cultural, economic 
and legal organisation of society enables some people to invade the choices of others, Pettit’s emphasis on 
the limiting the capacity of one agent to exercise power over another cannot adequately account for 
structural domination such as unequal social relations, and this is in marked contrast to Laclau. Moreover, 
Laclau introduced a set of conceptual distinctions between domination, subordination, and oppression and 
these categories add further depth to the analysis of arbitrary power of an individual’s will and influence. 
They draw attention to the crucial moment when subordinate groups become conscious of their 
‘oppression’ and a social space emerges to draw the existing institutions into question and provide an 
alternative. The differences between the neo-republican and Laclau’s post-Marxist theory are highlighted 
in this section regarding two alternate readings of Henrik Ibsen’s play A Doll’s House.  
In the second section, I examine their respective understandings of ‘emancipation’ and ‘freedom’. 
Again, we see that the idea of emancipation, and the associated idea of ‘liberation’, is derived both from 
the republican and Marxist traditions. However, Pettit does not model his theory of freedom as non-
domination on the idea of emancipation, and this is despite his reference to the master and slave 
relationship. This stands in contrast to Laclau, for whom emancipation remains the focal point of political 
struggle, despite formal equality, and who maintains the idea of the possibility of a more radical 
transformation in the underlying structures of society. In fact, Laclau retains key elements of the Marxist 
conception of emancipation, and the differences between Pettit and Laclau are further illustrated here 
regarding Marx’s famous distinction between ‘political’ and ‘human emancipation’. In addition, Laclau 
differentiates between emancipation and freedom, and he understands ‘freedom’ in terms of 
indeterminacy as well as self-determination.  
In the final section, I consider more generally Laclau’s and Pettit’s alternative conceptions of 
politics. We see that both thinkers place a premium on democratic contest in challenging and overturning 
arbitrary power. Nevertheless, in keeping with the differences which have emerged in the earlier sections, 
we see also that Pettit understands contestability as a politics of ‘redress’ within the existing institutions, 
whereas Laclau’s focus is on the struggle for hegemony and the possibility of transformation in the present 
institutional order. I conclude with the suggestion that the neo-republican and post-Marxist conceptions of 
politics each outline important elements in the struggle against subordination and domination.   
 
Neo-republicanism and Post-Marxism: on domination, subordination and oppression  
At the core of Pettit’s neo-republican theory is the idea that political agents are free when they are 
not subject to arbitrary controlling power by an alien individual will. This is distinct from the 
characteristically liberal view, as defended for example by Isiah Berlin, which associates freedom with the 
absence of interference or obstacles (Berlin, 1969). For Pettit, an individual can be subject to the impact of 
domination or arbitrary power where the capacity for such interference exists, even when there are no 
explicit obstacles to his/her free choice, or when the power to interfere in those choices is not directly 
exercised. Domination is the ‘alienating control on the part of other persons’, and to experience non-
domination is therefore not only to find yourself unconstrained by others, but more importantly, to find 
yourself in a situation where no one has the potential to interfere on an arbitrary basis in the choices that 
you make (Pettit, 1997: 52, 67; 2012: 84).4  Along with other contemporary neo-republican theorists such 
as Quentin Skinner, Pettit invokes the relationship between the master and the slave to illustrate what is at 
issue in a relationship of ‘domination’. Under ancient conditions of slavery, the slave is dependent on the 
master and at his mercy. This is particularly evident in the circumstances of the ‘lucky’ slave who happens 
to have a benevolent master. Although this slave may live a contented life, the slave’s relative security 
                                                      
4 See Pettit 1997 for his earlier notion of arbitrary power as not tracking the avowable interests of those 
affected by it (30). 
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remains entirely dependent on the good will of his master. The master has arbitrary control or dominium 
over the slave and this state of dependency creates uncertainty and unpredictability for the slave, in 
response to which the slave develops a servile and slave like mentality. In ancient Roman society, a 
comparable dynamic was also inherent in the relationship between the head of the household, the pater 
familas, and his wife and children. This is evident in the etymology of the English term domination, which 
has its roots in Roman law and is derived from the Latin word dominatus referring to a ruler or master 
(dominus) of a house (domus) (Lovett, 2010: 3). Unlike the slave who was considered a ‘thing’ and literally 
the property of the master, Roman women and children had the status of legal persons in Roman law, but 
they were nonetheless still dependent on father/husband who had responsibility for them, who could 
exercise autocratic power over them and who were ultimately at the mercy of his goodwill. This 
conception of ‘dependency’ is at the core of the ancient idea of domination, and Pettit reworks this idea in 
his theory of ‘arbitrary power’. Conversely, Pettit describes freedom as not ‘having to depend on the grace 
or mercy of others, being able to do one’s thing without asking their leave or permission’ (Pettit, 2003: 
394). 
Pettit uses Henry Ibsen’s A Doll’s House to further demonstrate the difference between the liberal 
notion of freedom as non-interference and his notion of freedom as non-domination (Pettit, 2014: xiii). I 
recount his reading of this play because this also helps to differentiate Pettit’s interpretation of domination 
from Laclau’s. A Doll’s House is set in nineteenth century Norwegian society and narrates the domestic 
affairs of the Helmer household. Nora Helmer, the wife of a successful banker Torvald (who is on the verge 
of a promotion), is being blackmailed by Krogstad (a bank employee) about a loan she took out early in her 
marriage to help pay for Torvald’s treatment when he was ill. Such a revelation will destroy Torvald’s 
honour and therefore his career. Torvald is sickened when he discovers that Nora lied and acted like a 
‘criminal’ by forging her father’s signature on the official loan papers (Ibsen, 2014: 59). However, once the 
creditor Krogstad sends back the bond of her debt, Torvald forgives Nora. He reconciles himself to her 
deed, with the thought that her fraudulent actions were a manifestation of her infantile behaviour.5 Pettit 
says that Nora ‘is the doll in the doll’s house, not a free woman’ (Pettit, 2014: xiv). Indeed, for Pettit, Nora’s 
relationship with Torvald is exemplary of the relationship of domination. Although Torvald does not 
directly interfere with Nora, she nonetheless remains unfree (i.e. despite her ‘negative liberty’) because 
she censors her actions to stay within Torvald’s approval. In other words, she adopts a servile mode of 
behaviour. For example, she covertly eats macaroons because Torvald frowns upon her eating them. Pettit 
says that Nora’s freedom is dependent upon Torvald’s good grace, and if Torvald withdrew his goodwill she 
would be subject to his arbitrary power (Pettit, 2014: xv). On Pettit’s account, for Nora to be truly free she 
needs to be free from domination, and, as he sees it, this requires safeguards against arbitrary interference 
in one’s choices as well as resources and legal protections against anyone else’s capacity to interfere 
(Pettit, 2014: xv).  
These are important insights into the machinations of power, and this neo-republican view has had 
a significant impact across contemporary political theory. However, Pettit has elaborated his conception of 
domination within a methodologically individualist approach where it is individual ‘agents’ who are the 
bearers of arbitrary power, or conversely who can be agents of freedom. If structural forms of power were 
to count as ‘domination’ then, according to Pettit, we ‘would lose the distinction between securing people 
against the natural effects of chance and incapacity and securing them against the thing that they may try 
to do to one another’ (Pettit, 1997: 52-3). However, this set of alternatives is too limited. In addition to the 
consequences of interfering actions by one agent over another and the natural effects of chance, from a 
post-Marxist perspective we need to grasp also the impact of other modes and asymmetries of power such 
as rank, status, influence and control, i.e. those that take systemic forms of subordination, such as the 
unequal distribution of wealth in society, or the processes of normalisation that leave some individuals and 
groups in positions of privileged and superior status and others in a subordinate or inferior position. These 
                                                      
5 Nora is a relation of servitude to Krogstad until the bond of her debt is returned. Indeed, Torvald acknowledges that ‘there can 
be no freedom or beauty about a home life that depends upon borrowing or debt’ (Ibsen, 2014: 5).  
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modes of ‘domination’ cannot be reduced to natural inequalities or chance, but nor can they be readily 
traced to the capacity of one agent to exercise his/her will over another. Pettit’s approach contrasts with 
many feminists, for whom ‘male domination is a structural and institutionalised feature of a whole society’ 
embedded in norms and practises (Friedman, 2008: 256). However, it also contrasts with more ‘critical’ 
republicans who similarly appreciate that patriarchy permeates throughout society in dominant social 
norms that hinder women even when they are formally legal citizens (Laborde: 2008: 16, 48).6 Indeed, it is 
crucial to appreciate that the systemic causes of patriarchy and other forms of domination cannot be 
readily referred to will or to the capacity for one agent to interfere in the choices of another agent, and 
here Laclau’s theory can be particularly instructive.  
  Laclau’s poststructuralist conception of structure and agency retains core elements of the 
conventional Marxist understanding of the role of structures in shaping social subjectivities. At the heart of 
Laclau’s approach, is a reworking of the Marxist idea that we are ‘bearers of historical structures’, or, as 
Laclau puts it, of the dominant ‘discourses’ that, following Louis Althusser, socialise (interpellate) us as 
subjects (Laclau, 1990). However, Laclau rejects the idea that capitalist relations of exploitation always 
have an overriding priority (even in the ‘last instance’), and, as I have already said in the introduction, he 
additionally stresses the constitutive incompletion of structural closure or ‘totality’. These processes of 
structural determination are never fully determinate or complete, and it is this inherent ‘dislocation’ of 
structural closure that leaves open a certain space for agency or freedom, ‘insofar as [agents] actualise 
certain structural potentialities and reject others’ (Laclau, 1990: 30). Moreover, this model of incomplete 
or dislocated structure is further accentuated with reference to a poststructuralist account of identity 
formation. Again, in contrast to Pettit’s conception of the relationships formed between individual agents, 
on Laclau’s account: identities are not initially self-referential, but rather always already (i.e. essentially) 
formed in relation to one-another (Laclau, 1990). In addition, these dynamics of intrinsic relationality are 
inherently relationships of power, i.e. where certain options are available, whilst others are necessarily 
suppressed or foreclosed (Laclau, 1990: 18). In other words, relations of identity involve hierarchy and 
exclusions which demarcate and distinguish one identity from another.7 
These are crucial methodological discernments, and because of these insights Laclau further 
proceeds to differentiate between alternative forms of identity/relations. Most importantly, for the 
discussion here, in his co-authored work with Chantal Mouffe, Laclau struck a crucial distinction between 
the concepts of subordination, oppression, and domination. In Laclau’s approach each of these terms 
carries specific connotations, and it is evident that the term ‘domination’ here has a somewhat different 
meaning to the neo-republican conception of arbitrary power that I have just outlined above. In fact, 
                                                      
6 Pettit has more recently sought to address structural forms of domination where he acknowledges that certain economic, 
cultural and legal conditions, enables some people to interfere with the choices of others (Pettit, 2012: 62). His response has 
been to limit the capacity for agents to exercise interference in other people’s choices and he sees law as the best means to 
address this. This move is to be welcome; however, this nonetheless reflects Pettit’s methodological individualism. Changes in 
the law and forms of law enforcement are very important measures and protections, but they are not equivalent to a change in 
the wider conditions such as norms, practices and processes that sustain entrenched relations of subordination and hierarchy 
that are reproduced through seemingly innocuous everyday practices and forms of socialisation embedded in institutions. See 
Kolodny, 2014b for why the law is not sufficient for social equality. 
7 In some of his earliest writings, Pettit also engaged the traditions of French (post)structuralism or anti-phenomenologists 
(Pettit, 1975). However, two key differences distinguish Pettit’s and Laclau’s reading of Saussure’s structural model of 
signification. Firstly, Pettit appears to accept Saussure’s synchronic approach to language as a closed system of differences. This 
has the effect of naturalising the existing structure, whereas Laclau’s poststructuralism rejects the fixity and closure of any 
system, draws attention to the power relations that sustain semantic units and rules, and emphasises the subject’s capacity to 
challenge the predominant discourse. Secondly, Pettit claims that Saussure’s structural model of meaning, with its account of 
structure in terms of the relations between the units within a language, cannot be carried over from the linguistic to non-
linguistic domains (Pettit, 1975: 70). For Pettit, Althusser, Lacan and Foucault cannot be counted as structuralists under the 
definition he uses. This is because there is nothing in Althusser’s ‘ideology’, Foucault’s ‘archive’, and Lacan’s ‘unconscious’ to 
‘correspond properly to the [structural role of the] sentence in a language’ and are instead languages [structures] in their own 
right (Pettit, 1975: 70). This is an important difference between Pettit and Laclau, and provides some explanation regarding how 
the word ‘structure’ is used in their respective approaches. For Pettit, structure is theorised in an individualist manner.  
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Laclau uses the term subordination (and not domination) to describe an asymmetrical relationship of 
arbitrary power, where one ‘agent is subjected to the decisions of another’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 
153).8 This unequal and asymmetrical relation between two or more agents is not a one-off instance nor is 
it a relation of oppression (as we shall see below), but entrenched or sedimented norms and practices in 
society. Such situations are still widespread in families (husband/wife) and workplaces 
(employer/employee) and are not necessarily doubted by those engaged in them (Laclau and Mouffe, 
1985: 153).9 However, what interests Laclau are the circumstances by which these hierarchical relations 
come to be seen as illegitimate, i.e. seen as relationships of ‘oppression’, from the perspective of 
subordinate groups and/or individuals. Pettit’s focus is on the individual agent and this is also the case for 
others who use the term domination in the analytical tradition.10 Laclau defines the circumstances of 
‘domination’ precisely in terms of a moment of awaking, i.e. when the subordinate agent begins to 
perceive a set of hierarchical relations as unfair or unjust (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 159). This is further 
linked to another core category in Laclau’s approach which is the notion of ‘antagonism’. As we will see in 
more detail in the subsequent sections, Laclau envisages political struggle in terms of the circumstances by 
which subjugated identities come to realise that some external identity or practice, i.e. the identity of ‘the 
oppressor’, is oppressing them and preventing the full constitution of their own identity (Laclau, 1990: 21). 
Laclau calls this situation a relationship of ‘antagonism’, whereby ‘the oppressed [increasingly] constitute 
their identity by denying the identity of the oppressor’ (Laclau cited in Worsham and Olson, 1999: 24). For 
Laclau, a relation of oppression is ‘relations of subordination which have transformed themselves into sites 
of antagonism’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 153-4). Moreover, it is precisely in these moments of 
‘antagonism’ that the ‘undecidable nature’ of the given set of social relationships become ‘visible’, because 
here the unequal and hierarchical power relationship that had previously appeared as normal and natural 
are now destabilised and rendered potentially open to change (Laclau, 1990: 35).  
 It is clear from this brief summation, firstly that Laclau shares a great deal with the neo-republican 
conception of the exercise of arbitrary power. At the same time however, it is evident that Laclau’s 
understanding of the relationship between structure and agency is not just concerned with the arbitrary 
will of individual agents but also the arbitrary power of social relations, processes, norms and practices 
that place some individuals and groups in subservient positions and others in positions of control and 
influence. He also appears to have a far stronger emphasis on the circumstances by which oppressed 
groups become conscious of relationships of subordination and thereby draw those norms and practices 
into question. We will see in subsequent sections that these differences further play out in their respective 
conceptions of political struggle. First however, we can further accentuate these alternatives by returning 
to A Doll’s House. Although Laclau does not himself offer a reading of the play, we can nonetheless 
consider the relationship between Nora and Torvold from a Laclauean perspective and contrast this with 
Pettit’s reading.  
Pettit’s interpretation of A Doll’s House demonstrates his concern with the agentic relationships 
between two individuals. Pettit’s emphasis is clearly on the ways in which Nora is subject to the 
idiosyncrasies of Torvald’s will, attitudes and decisions. But the ‘subject positions’ of these two agents are 
also established within a wider system of subordination. Nora is a subject of nineteenth century Norwegian 
                                                      
8 See also Howarth et al, 2016. 
9 Kolodny (2014a; 2014b) questions Pettit’s use of the term domination and suggest that the examples he provides such as the 
slave and the slave holder or patriarchal relations are instances of relations of subordination and more specifically relations of 
superiority and inferiority. He says they are relations of social inequality.  
10 See Vrousalis (2013) for whom domination is not just asymmetrical power relations (power over) where one agent affects 
another but where the power-overing is done so in a way that is disrespectful (demeaning, degrading, humiliating). For 
Vrousalis, the relation between master/slave, serf/lord and husband/wife in the patriarchal family all involve disrespect (140). 
He theorises domination from a third person perspective looking at the relationship between two agents. For Laclau, domination 
is the perspective from the individual/group who becomes aware that she/he is subordinated and subjugated to unequal social 
relations such as hierarchy or patriarchy. Laclau’s conception of subordination shares similarities with Niko Kolodny’s (2014a; 
2014b) concerns about subordination understood as inequality in social relations (relations of inferiority and superiority) that 
enables some people to have greater opportunity to influence decisions and outcomes. 
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society which legitimates patriarchy. Her identity as a daughter, wife, and mother is constituted by a 
system which considers such subordination normal, natural and therefore legitimate; and she doesn’t 
contest her identity or consider herself ‘oppressed’. In the act of marriage, Nora is handed over as an 
object of property from her father to her husband, with whom a similar subordinate relationship is 
reproduced (Ibsen, 2104: 40). The normalising power of these structures mean that Nora and Torvald are 
each socialised into their respective subject positions, they internalise and identify with them. On a 
Laclauean reading (and following Althusser and Jacques Lacan), we might say that Nora (like all subjects) 
has an imaginary relation to her own lived conditions of existence. Nora doesn’t consider her relationship 
with Torvald to be unjust, i.e. to be a relationship of ‘domination’ or ‘oppression’, or at least this is so up to 
the point when her imaginary relation with Torvald is shattered. This happens in a crucial ‘dislocatory’ 
moment in the play, that is, when Nora grasps that Torvald wouldn’t risk his life, honour, or status to save 
her (Ibsen, 2014: 39). standing At this point, the forms of identity and identification that sustain Nora’s 
subject positions are interrupted or dislodged, and she begins to question the legitimacy of her society and 
the background structures which treat her unfairly. It is clear also that the kinds of solutions that Pettit 
proposes to address relations of arbitrary power – i.e. legal protections and safeguards that limit the 
capacity for one individual to exercise arbitrary power over another – cannot address the modes of 
subordination built into these background structures. On the Laclauean reading, what is required instead is 
an understanding of how Nora could turn this initial moment of ‘dislocation’ into a set of political demands 
that might start to draw the existing institutions into question, and to further understand these 
requirements we turn now to Laclau’s reworking of the ideas of emancipation and freedom. Again, a 
comparison with the neo-republican perspective is helpful in bringing out the distinctiveness of his 
approach.  
 
From Domination to Emancipation and Freedom  
Since the early modern struggles to abolish the transatlantic slave trade, the idea of ‘emancipation’ 
has been associated with the act of setting someone free from a relation of oppression or bondage. 
Emancipation is clearly an important category in Marxist theory, evident for example in Marx’s analysis of 
the modern wage/labour relationship in terms of ‘wage slavery’, and manifest also in his famous 
distinction in On the Jewish Question between mere ‘political emancipation’ (in the form of bourgeois civil 
rights) and genuine ‘human emancipation’ (characterised by the abolition of private property, and hence of 
‘wage slavery’) (Marx, 1994). The term ‘emancipation’ is also a central category in Laclau’s post-Marxist 
theory, and this is evident in the collection of essays he published in 1996 with the title Emancipation(s). In 
this section, we see that the term derives from the Roman republican tradition, and I consider points of 
contrast between ‘emancipation’ and the related notions of ‘liberation’ and ‘freedom’. I first recall the 
etymology of the term ‘emancipation’, before exploring the way this idea functions respectively in Pettit’s 
and Laclau’s theories. Surprising perhaps, given his explicit reference to the master and slave relationship, 
we see that ‘emancipation’ does not play any significant part in Pettit’s neo-republican theory. There are in 
fact good reasons for this, and again these insights point towards key differences between Pettit’s neo-
republicanism and Laclau’s post-Marxism. To further draw out these differences, I read their respective 
positions in light of Marx’s political/human emancipation distinction; with Pettit’s theory operating 
exclusively at the level of formal political rights and freedoms, whereas Laclau’s approach retains 
important characteristics of what Marx called ‘human emancipation’, albeit also with important 
qualifications.   
The term ‘emancipation’ comes from the Latin emancipatusis, which is a compound of two Latin 
words ex and mancipum, which signify ‘away’ and ‘ownership’ respectively; hence emancipatusis means to 
‘give away ownership’. In Roman law, ‘emancipation’ did not in fact refer to the liberation of slaves from 
their bondage, but to a legal mechanism for releasing someone (child/or wife) from the control of another 
(father/husband) and thus altering their status (Gardner, 1998: 10). The term was used to refer to ‘freeing 
of a son from the legal authority of the male head of the family, thus making him responsible for himself in 
law’ (Roberts, 2014:  583; Gardner, 1998: 10). Although sons could establish independence in this way, this 
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did not apply to a slave because of his/her status in society was considered as a ‘thing’ and not a person. 
However, slaves could become ‘liberated’ from their bondage, but this was through the process of 
‘manumission’ which took the form of ‘ceremonies performed by the master, [and] legally recognised 
within a society’ (Harrill, 1995: 4). Despite these subtle differences, following the modern struggle against 
chattel slavery: the terms emancipation and liberation have come to be seen as more or less equivalent, 
and they have been generalised to refer to any struggle to liberate someone from injustice and oppression, 
and often against the will of the ‘oppressor’ (Biesta, 2010: 41). In other words, since the time of the 
Enlightenment, emancipation has come to mean ‘the liberation of slaves without the observance of any 
manumission procedures [and] regardless of the slaveholder’s [or master’s] interests’ (Harrill, 1995: 4). In 
the 18th century, the term emancipation was ‘used in relation to the emancipation of slaves, in the 19th 
century to the emancipation of women and workers’ and in the 20th century to the independence from 
colonial rule (Hewlett, 2007: 1; Biesta, 2010: 42). Marx’s use of the term clearly follows in this same broad 
tradition (See Hewlett, 2007). 
Given Pettit’s invocation of the master/slave relationship to describe the circumstances of 
domination, we might expect him also to model a theory of politics on the idea of emancipation. However, 
in fact we find that, apart from few scattered references, emancipation plays no substantive or significant 
role in Pettit’s neo-republicanism conception of freedom as non-domination. The reason for this is that the 
point of departure for Pettit’s analysis is existing western democracies where the status of individuals has 
been formally equalized in law. Indeed, this context of formal equality under the law sets the basic 
parameters for Pettit’s approach where his focus is on ‘arbitrary relations’ of power that manifest in the 
dynamics between individual agents. However, background structures of inequality and undue influence or 
what Niko Kolodny calls unequal social relations persist under conditions of formal equality and in 
democracies (Kolodny 2014a; 2014b). So, whilst Pettit states that ‘freedom involves emancipation from 
any subordination, liberation from any such dependency’ (Pettit, 1997: 5), his invocation of the 
master/slave metaphor functions only as an analogy. His is not a politics of setting someone free from an 
oppression, because all individuals are already considered equal citizens of the democratic republic. 
Instead, Pettit’s concern is to counter the residual elements of arbitrary power that some agents wield 
over others, and this through legal redress as well as a politics of contestation. Nevertheless, as we will see 
in more detail in the final section, this is a politics that is played out essentially within the context of the 
existing institutions. 
If we turn the categories that Marx introduced in On the Jewish Question, we could say that Pettit’s 
approach operates exclusively at the level of what Marx calls ‘political emancipation’. Marx used this term 
to describe the formal freedom of individuals, characteristic of modern liberal democracies, and which he 
associated with the liberation of the bourgeoisie from premodern aristocratic and feudal structures. On 
Marx’s reading, modern democracies clearly allow (some) individuals a degree of freedom in the form of 
rights and protections from state interference, but this formal freedom is intrinsically linked to an atomistic 
vision of society (which is destructive of genuine human sociality), as well as to ‘real’ capitalist social 
relations that are anything but free, i.e. for the class of labourers who are forced to sell their labour power 
under impoverished and exploitative conditions (Marx, 1994). Marx was of course aware that the 
circumstances of modern wage labourers are different from ancient and modern forms of slavery, but the 
deeper point is that there is nonetheless elements of force, influence and exploitation inherent in capitalist 
wage/labour relations, despite the formal freedoms of employment contract, or, more generally, despite 
the supposedly ‘contractual’ basis of modern state and society (Marx, 1994). Marx is not entirely dismissive 
of modern formal political and civic freedoms, but the key point is that – even if the formal rights of 
citizens are extended to the labourers themselves (as of course they have been since the time of Marx’s 
writing) - the ‘bourgeoisie revolution’ is nonetheless only one stage in the direction of a more fundamental 
movement towards genuine ‘human emancipation’ which Marx associated with a more fundamental set of 
changes in the underlying social order of capitalist society. And this can only be achieved through the ‘self-
emancipation’ of the working class from the tutelage of the wage/labour relationship (Engels, 1990: 60). 
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 Laclau’s theory breaks with some of the core assumptions at work in Marx’s account of ‘human 
emancipation’. Most significantly, Laclau rejects the claim that the ‘exploitation’ characteristic of the 
wage/labour relation represents the single most important fault line of oppression that underpins modern 
capitalist society (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 124-5). On Laclau’s account, capitalist exploitation must be 
placed on an equal ontological status with other fault lines of domination, e.g. gender oppression, the 
oppression of diverse sexualities, of the environment etc. He also clearly rejects the teleological 
assumptions of Marx’s theory of history, which presume a certain necessity in the forthcoming proletarian 
revolution and which portray the post-revolutionary communist society in terms of de-conflicted or 
pacified society; seen as synonymous with the realisation of ‘man in his species being’ and with a post-
political ‘administration of things’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985; Laclau, 1990; Marx, 1994). These assumptions 
drop out of Laclau’s post-Marxist and anti-essentialist approach. Nevertheless, despite these theoretical 
moves, it is evident also that Laclau retains what is arguably the core of Marx’s political/human 
emancipation distinction, which is the idea that any genuine politics of emancipation must contest the 
underlying structural sources of subordination that persist in modern societies (unequal social relations) 
despite our formal equality as citizens, and that the moment of ‘emancipation’ allows for the possible 
emergence of a different kind of institutional ordering. Indeed, Laclau has been explicit in asserting that we 
need to retain and rework these core elements of conventional Marxist theory. In Laclau’s terminology, 
this means a) that the struggle for emancipation has an essentially ‘dichotomous’ form, in the sense that 
any moment of emancipation is mutually exclusive, i.e. forms a decisive break with, the order that 
preceded it, and b) that emancipation has an intrinsic ‘ground dimension’ in the sense that it must take 
place at the foundations of the social fabric and not just at the level of political and legal institutions, so 
that all spheres of society are potentially transformed (Laclau, 1996: 2). It follows from these insights that 
Laclau’s understanding of politics cannot be reduced to a defence of existing liberal democratic 
institutions, as suggested by some of his more conventional Marxist critics (Geras, 1988: 2, 54). Not only is 
Laclau’s conception of emancipation incompatible with Berlin’s vision of ‘negative liberty’, Laclau’s positon 
is incommensurate with any more general defence of the status quo. Whilst rights and formal legal 
protections are important, their realisation does not exhaust the sources of oppression in society, and 
Laclau’s politics reaches out for a more fundamental shift in the existing institutions, whereby people will 
come to socially relate to one other in egalitarian ways that are distinct from the existing capitalist society.  
However, despite this clear line of emphasis in Laclau’s work, we need also to further distinguish 
between his conception of ‘emancipation’ and ‘freedom’. In Laclau’s theory these terms are not 
synonymous. Moreover, I would suggest that there are in fact two core aspects to Laclau’s idea of 
‘freedom’, again neither of which are compatible with the idea of ‘negative liberty’ or reducible to the 
possession of formal political rights. This is freedom understood respectively as indeterminacy and as 
something like self-determination. We have already examined Laclau’s conception of freedom as 
indeterminacy in the previous section, i.e. in his theory of structural ‘dislocation’. Indeed, Laclau thinks of 
freedom as indeterminacy when he writes that it is because of ‘dislocation’, i.e. because of the failure of 
the structure to fully constitute the subject as an object, that there is freedom (Laclau, 1990: 44, 47). 
Indeed, this ‘absence of determination’, provides a crucial moment in the emergence of any political 
struggle, and so the ‘greater the structural indetermination’ in a given conjuncture of social forces, the 
‘greater the freedom’ (Laclau, 1990: 35, 40). This conception of freedom as indeterminacy is distinct both 
from the struggle for emancipation (i.e. a struggle for liberation from ‘oppression’, which we have just 
outlined above), and from the idea of freedom as a creative and collective act of self-generation. This latter 
conception of freedom Laclau associates with the emergence of a new hegemonic/symbolic order, with 
the self-determination by a people or populous, which can (but not necessarily will) arise from a struggle 
for emancipation (Laclau, 1996: 1, 13).11 Implicit in these distinctions is the assumption that the struggle 
                                                      
11 For Laclau, freedom involves self-determination where an ‘act of decision’ takes place in an undecidable terrain (1996b, 52, 
54). This is different from Pettit’s notion of political decision where a resolution is reached after rational consideration and 
deliberation. For Laclau, following Derrida, ‘decision’ or ‘madness of the decision’ cannot be rationalised and it provides the 
conditions for the emergence of the subject (1996b; 54, 55). 
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for emancipation is a necessary but insufficient element in the actualisation of ‘freedom’. In this regard, 
Laclau is, I think, close to the fundamentals of two other continental thinkers, Hannah Arendt and Michel 
Foucault. Despite otherwise significant difference in detail; each of these three thinkers differentiate 
between what Laclau calls ‘emancipation’ (which for Arendt and Foucault is ‘liberation’), i.e. a struggle to 
be liberated from necessity or oppression, and the notion of (what all three thinkers call) practices of 
‘freedom’, and which they associative with something like an initiatory or generative moment (See Arendt, 
1965; Foucault, 1984: 284-245). Like Arendt and Foucault, Laclau also places a premium on political 
contestation, i.e. as the source of this generative moment, and in the final section we look more closely at 
the detail of Laclau’s understanding of political struggle.12 Again, the details of Laclau’s understanding of 
politics are brought out through a comparison with Pettit’s neo-republicanism.  
 
Pettit and Laclau on politics as contestation 
Laclau and Pettit both associate politics with contestation, and they each see political struggle as a 
key mechanism for challenging domination. This emphasis on the value of political conflict is often 
associated with ‘agonistic’ theories of democracy, which have recently been reconstructed by Mark 
Wenman (Wenman, 2013). Wenman emphasises the link between contemporary agonistic theories and 
the work of Machiavelli, who stressed the productive force that contest plays within the republic as a way 
of repeatedly challenging hierarchy and inequality. Neither Laclau or Pettit are typically associated with 
agonistic theory, however I think we can read each of their contributions as falling broadly within this 
tradition. Furthermore, in keeping with the differences we have thus far established, we see in this final 
section that Pettit emphasises the importance of the permanent possibility of contesting claims to power 
and authority within the existing institutions, i.e. as a necessary condition for challenging arbitrary power 
(Pettit, 2007: 102). Whereas, for Laclau, the decisive element of political struggle is associated with the 
moment that the existing regime is unable to accommodate and contain a series of political demands, at 
which point he says we see the emergence of a genuinely populist movement, one that has the potential 
to alter the symbolic horizon of meaning and hence to establish a new institutional order. Again, these are 
significant differences, and the objective here is to compare them. I nonetheless conclude with the claim 
that they are each represent important dimensions of political struggle. 
Thus far, we have seen that Pettit highlights the role of legal protections, which are designed to 
limit the capacity for arbitrary interference either by the state over its citizens or of one individual over 
another. However, unlike the predominant strands within contemporary liberal theory, Pettit does not 
think we can fully ensure the freedom of citizens through legal mechanisms or on the basis of procedural 
neutrality. Because of his emphasis on individual agency, Pettit is concerned with the element of discretion 
that resides in decision making (despite formal rules and procedures), and so he is focused on the need for 
institutions and forums that will enable citizens to challenge and contest government/public decisions 
(Pettit, 1997:187,277). He develops a rich account of a ‘contestatory democracy’ understood as a 
supplement to the main institutions of electoral democracy, and at the heart of which is the idea of the 
right of the people to call public decisions into question. Indeed, Pettit understands contestation in terms 
of an individual’s or a minority community’s capacity to review legislation and administrative and judicial 
decision making; that is when they can show that their ‘avowable perceived interests’ have been ignored 
(Pettit, 1999: 181: Pettit, 1997: 195). This might take the form of bringing a particular decision ‘before a 
public commission or parliamentary inquiry on the grounds that it is improper in some way, challenging it 
before an administrative appeals tribunal, or complaining about it to an ombudsman’ (Pettit, 1999: 181). 
This implies that the people have a certain ‘editorial’ role in democracy in addition to the ‘authorial’ role of 
                                                      
12 Several contributors - including Foucault, Jacques Ranciere, and various feminist writers - have stressed limitations in the idea 
of ‘emancipation’. The struggle for emancipation can become a trap, because it inscribes the oppressed into a set of subject 
positions constructed by the dominant regime of power. The emancipatory logic also seems to imply that the oppressed person 
becomes free because of the act of emancipation, and this can ‘install dependency into the heart of emancipation’ (Biesta, 2010: 
41, 45). Laclau is mindful of these problems, and careful to insist that emancipation is a necessary but insufficient condition of 
freedom understood as self-determination.  
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their collective will, and in particular, this allows for a check upon the excesses of the majoritarian 
principle, which, says Pettit, can often be the source of an ‘ultimate form of arbitrariness’ (Pettit, 1997: 8).  
Pettit’s emphasis on democracy as contestation has come under considerable criticism. For 
example, David Owen (2009) shows how Pettit’s theory reduces contestation to a vehicle through which 
we negotiate conflicts of interests rather than a medium through which we work out our civic identities;  
John McCormick (2011) makes the case that Pettit’s contestatory procedures are not at the fore of his 
conception of politics but operate only in a reactive manner where citizens react to governments and 
Richard Bellamy (2016) suggests that, in reality, all voices do not get an equal hearing and that the wealthy 
are most likely able to trigger the review of political decisions in this way. Consider for example, the recent 
case of Gina Miller who took the UK government to the Supreme Court over its handling of Article 50. 
These are important and insightful criticisms, and I broadly concur with the view that Pettit offers an overly 
narrow conception of political contest, which is of course in keeping with the main characteristics of his 
theory we have outlined in the previous sections. My sense is however, that the kind of politics that Pettit 
describes nonetheless remains an important element in the struggle against subordination, and I come 
back to this in the conclusion. First however, we need to compare his conception of politics with Laclau, 
and of relevance here is Pettit’s insistence that ‘popular movements’ do not form the basis of his theory of 
democratic contestation (Pettit, 1997: 195). Indeed, Pettit is clear that his objective is to provide 
mechanisms whereby individual citizens can exercise greater control over public decision making (Pettit, 
2012: 185). Moreover, this will often involve an element of ‘depolitisation’, so that cases can be heard by 
experts and away from the tumult of popular discussion (Pettit, 1997: 2012). The process of ‘depolitisation’ 
is deeply problematic for challenging subordination and arbitrary power and as Bellamy identifies it cannot 
escape power relations and therefore risks engendering domination (Bellamy, 2007: 146-174; 175). As we 
will now see, these points of emphasis are in marked contrast to Laclau. 
Like Pettit, Laclau accentuates contestation in his account of ‘radical democracy’. He says, ‘there is 
democracy [only] as long as there is the possibility of unlimited questioning’ (Laclau, 1990: 187). However, 
we might situate Laclau’s conception of democratic contest precisely where Pettit leaves off. As we have 
already noted in the previous sections, Laclau thinks of politics in terms of competing hegemonic struggles. 
Genuine politics, on Laclau’s account, is not something that is contained within the existing institutions, 
but also refers to those moments of dislocation when one symbolic social order is drawn into question and 
is possibly superseded by an alternative regime. In his late work, Laclau elaborated these ideas in the terms 
of a distinctive theory of ‘populism’ (Laclau, 2005). However, there is a clear consistency in the detail of 
Laclau’s conception of democratic struggle running throughout his publications, from the time of 
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy onwards, and the key elements in his approach are as follows. On Laclau’s 
account, every political context is defined by a set of ‘demands’ and these demands are directed towards 
the existing institutions. The existing regime will seek to respond to these discrete demands and to prevent 
them forming any kind of equivalence with one another. To the extent that the demands are fulfilled, they 
will be repeatedly absorbed in the existing institutions. Pettit’s politics of democratic ‘redress’ seems to 
operate exclusively at this level. However, Laclau is interested in what happens precisely when the politics 
of redress fails, i.e. when the existing regime is unable to absorb the individual demands. At this point, 
according to Laclau, the individual demands start to see themselves in a relationship of ‘antagonism’ with 
the existing regime, which increasingly comes to be perceived as the ‘oppressor’. Here the demands also 
change from being ‘requests’ that could potentially be absorbed within the current system, to ‘claims’ that 
require broader transformations in the existing order (Laclau, 2005). Now the diverse demands also come 
to see themselves in a common ‘chain of equivalence’, i.e. they recognise their correspondence with each 
other in their shared opposition to the exiting regime that oppresses them all. This creates a ‘frontier 
effect’ or dichotomous struggles of ‘us versus them’; and from here on the demands are engaged in a more 
general struggle for ‘emancipation’. Finally, to the extent that this struggle is successful, one of the 
demands begins to operate as a representative or a stand in for the series of demands, that is, it comes to 
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embody a ‘generalised demand’ that might, in turn, form the basis of a new symbolic or hegemonic 
order.13 
 Once again, we see that there are important points of similarity but also crucial differences 
between the neo-republican and post-Marxist conceptions of politics as contestation. Where Pettit’s focus 
is clearly on the importance of democratic contest within the context of the existing institutions, Laclau’s 
conception of politics as the struggle for hegemony exhibits important continuities with Marx’s idea of 
‘human emancipation’. Indeed, Laclau associates the function of the ‘generalised demand’ with the 
embodiment of a certain ‘universality’ or fullness, i.e. that transcends the particularity of the discrete 
individual demands, and in his late writings Laclau linked this moment of universality with ‘populism’ and 
with the construction of ‘the people’ (Laclau, 2005: 223). At the same time however, we must note also 
once again important qualifications in Laclau’s post-Marxism, because on Laclau’s reading the hegemonic 
embodiment of universality only ever takes the form of a temporary personification of an (essentially) 
absent fullness, and so this moment of plenitude could never be fully realised, for example in the form of a 
communist society at the ‘end of history’ (Laclau, 1996: 47-65). In fact, Laclau understands democratic 
politics precisely in terms of an open-ended (non-dialectical) struggle of different groups to temporally 
stand in for this impossible fullness.  
 
Conclusion 
The juxtaposition with Pettit’s neo-republicanism has accentuated certain facets of Laclau’s theory. 
We have seen how his is not a theory of contestation internal to the existing institutions. To the contrary, 
there are important elements of continuity between Laclau’s work and aspects of classical Marxism. We 
have noted also several limitations in Pettit’s approach. I nevertheless conclude with the thought that both 
neo-republicanism and post-Marxism provide important insights for the perennial struggle against 
subordination and arbitrary power.      
The movement of democratic struggles over the past three centuries has overturned many forms of 
oppression in western societies. This has given rise to the formal equality of citizens, but these struggles 
have also altered, to some degree, the more structural conditions of oppression embedded in wider 
societal norms and practices. For example, the position of women in society has changed significantly 
because of several waves of feminist activism, and we no longer recognise many of the societal norms that 
formed the backdrop to Ibsen’s A Doll’s House. Having said that, it is also evident that western societies are 
still characterised by many hierarchical and oppressive social relations and forms of inequality, and the 
relationship between western and non-western states and societies is also characterised by entrenched 
and systemic structures of power. Because of these ongoing conditions, Pettit’s focus on a politics of 
redress within the existing institutions is a step towards politics of ‘non-domination’, but neither should we 
entirely dismiss the kinds of politics that Pettit describes and focus exclusively, with Laclau, on moments of 
hegemonic transformation. As some critics of Laclau have pointed out, his theory ‘has little to say’ about 
the specific institutional arrangements that might facilitate radical democracy (Keenan, 1995: 82). And it is 
precisely at the level of institutionalised contestation, where Pettit makes a valuable contribution. Indeed, 
we don’t have to choose decisively – at the level of theory - between these alternatives, and we should see 
them instead as both relevant strategies in an overall struggle against subordination.14 By way of closure, 
we can further illustrate the potential complementarity of these perspectives regarding the thought of 
John Locke. Indeed, Pettit likens his model of contestatory democracy to Locke’s conception of popular 
sovereignty under a mixed constitution, which enables the citizens to contest the decisions of their 
representatives and to resist abuses of power (Pettit, 1999: 183; Lovett and Pettit, 2009: 25; Pettit, 2012: 
213). This is an important tradition in modern political thought, one which links back also to Machiavelli’s 
emphasis on the productive role of contest within the republic, and I think this vision of politics continues 
                                                      
13 This summary of Laclau’s approach is reconstructed from several sources across his various publications. As we have noted, 
there is a remarkable consistency in the core elements of Laclau’s conception of the struggle for hegemony, from 1985 onwards.  
14 From Glynos’s and Howarth’s (2007) social logics perspective, we could say that the differences between Laclau and Pettit are 
that Laclau’s focus is on ontological conditions (the political) whilst Pettit’s is ontic issues (politics). 
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to be of great importance in the context of contemporary political struggles. There are times however, 
when the struggle with arbitrary power requires citizens to go further; to reclaim what Locke calls their 
‘natural power or liberty’ from the existing institutions, so they might reconstitute the body politic in the 
form of a new institutional order. In Locke’s thought this implies a natural right to resistance and 
revolution, and in Laclau this is the ever-present possibility of a decisive moment of transition to a new 
hegemony.  
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